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Abstract—To establish secure (point-to-point and/or broadcast)
communication channels among the nodes of a wireless sensor
network is a fundamental task. To this end, a plethora of (so-
called) key pre-distribution schemes have been proposed in the
past [1][2][3][4][5]. All these schemes, however, rely on shared
secret(s), which are assumed to be somehow pre-loaded onto the
sensor nodes.
In this paper, we propose a novel method for secure initialization
of sensor nodes based on a visual out-of-band channel. Using
the proposed method, the administrator of a sensor network can
distribute keys onto the sensor nodes, necessary to bootstrap key
pre-distribution. Our secure initialization method requires only
a little extra cost, is efficient and scalable with respect to the
number of sensor nodes. Moreover, based on a usability study
that we conducted, the method turns out to be quite user-friendly
and easy to use by naive human users.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor nodes and sensor networks (WSN) have
numerous applications in monitoring diverse aspects of the
environment. Ready examples include monitoring of: struc-
tural/seismic activity, wildlife habitat, air pollution, border
crossings, nuclear emission and water quality. In some applica-
tions, sensor nodes operate in a potentially hostile environments
and security measures are needed to inhibit or detect sensor
node compromise and/or tampering with inter-node or node-
to-sink communication. A large body of literature has been
accumulated in the last decade dealing with many aspects of
sensor network security, e.g., key management, secure routing
and DoS detection [6], [7], [2], [8].
In a WSN environment, the nodes might need to communi-
cate sensitive data among themselves and with the sink (also
referred to as “sink”). The communication among the nodes
might be point-to-point and/or broadcast, depending upon the
application. These communication channels are easy to eaves-
drop on and to manipulate, raising the very real threat of the
so-called Man-in-the-Middle (MiTM) attacker. A fundamental
task, therefore, is to secure these communication channels.
Key Pre-Distribution and the Underlying Assumption. A
number of so-called “key pre-distribution” techniques to boot-
strap secure communication in a WSN have been proposed
[1], [2], [3], [4], [5]. However, all of them assume that,
before deployment, sensor nodes are somehow pre-installed
with secret(s) shared with other sensor nodes and/or the sink.
The TinySec architecture [9] also assumes that the nodes are
loaded with shared keys prior to deployment. This might be
a reasonable assumption in some, but certainly not all, cases.
Consider, for example, an individual user (Bob) who wants
to install a sensor network to monitor the perimeter of his
property. He purchases a set of commodity noise-and-vibration
sensor nodes at some retailer and wants to deploy the sensor
nodes with his home computer acting as the sink. Being off-
the-shelf, these sensor nodes are not sold with any built-in
secrets. Some types of sensor nodes might have a USB (or
similar) connector that allows Bob to plug each sensor node
into his computer to perform secure initialization. This would
be immune to both eavesdropping and MiTM attacks. However,
sensor nodes might not have any interface other than wireless,
since having a special “initialization” interface influences the
complexity and the cost of the sensor node. Also, note that
Bob would have to perform security initialization manually
and separately for each sensor node. This is not scalable since
potentially many sensor nodes might be involved.
Also, it is important to note that keys can not always be
pre-loaded during the manufacturing phase because eventual
customers might not trust the manufacturer. Moreover, a PKI-
based solution might be infeasible as it would require a global
infrastructure involving many manufacturers.1
Secure Initialization Approach. Therefore, the best possi-
ble strategy would be for the network administrator to him-
self/herself perform the key distribution on-site. Due to lack of
hardware interfaces (such as USB interfaces) on sensor nodes
and for usability reasons, this key distribution should be per-
formed wirelessly. Prior key pre-distribution schemes assume
the existence of some pre-installed secret (such as a point on a
bivariate polynomial f(x, y) in [4]) using which the shared keys
can be derived. Therefore, the task of key distribution is reduced
to establishing a secure channel between the administrator’s
computer (the sink node) and each node. The resulting secure
channels can in turn be used to securely transfer, from the sink
to each node, the shared secrets necessary to bootstrap key pre-
distribution. Since the administrator might need to initialize a
large number of sensor nodes, the process needs to be repeated
in batches. The larger the number of sensor nodes in each batch,
1The problem that we consider in this paper is very similar to the problem
of “device pairing”, the premise of which is also based on the fact that the
devices wanting to communicate with each other do not share any pre-shared
secrets or a common PKI with each other [10].
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the more scalable is the secure initialization method.
Prior Work: Message-In-a-Bottle. A sensor network initial-
ization method, called “Message-In-a-Bottle” (MiB), with the
above properties was recently proposed by Kuo et al. [11]. In
MiB, the key distribution takes place inside a Faraday Cage,
which is used to shield communication from eavesdropping
and outside interference. MiB can support key distribution onto
multiple sensor nodes2 in a batch and from the administrator’s
perspective, it is quite user-friendly. However, it has some
drawbacks. The first problem is the need to obtain and carry
around a specialized piece of equipment – a Faraday Cage.
As illustrated in [11], building a truly secure Faraday Cage is
a challenge. The cost and the physical size of the Cage can
be problematic. In other words, only a very few sensor motes
could be supported in each batch with a reasonably priced and
reasonably sized cage. The second drawback with MiB is that
if the initialization process fails for only one sensor node or if
there is an error (e.g., if the cage was not properly closed), the
entire batch of sensor nodes needs to be re-initialized and re-
keyed from scratch. Third, a batch of sensor motes must consist
of homogeneous sensor motes with similar weights (the weight
is used to calculate the number of motes inside the Cage [11]).
Fourth, at least one additional mote (called “keying device”)
that possesses a physical interface, such as USB connector, is
needed. This increases both the cost and the complexity of the
system.
Out-of-Band Channels. To address the aforementioned draw-
backs with MiB, we consider an alternative approach based
on out-of-band (OOB) channels. The OOB (audio, visual or
tactile) channels have recently been utilized in the context of
secure device pairing application [10], [12], [13], [14], used
to establish shared keys between two previously un-associated
devices (we review these methods in Section II). Unlike the
wireless communication channel, the OOB channels are both
perceivable and manageable by the human user(s) operating the
devices, and thus can be used to authenticate information ex-
changed over the wireless channel. Unlike the wireless channel,
the attacker can not remain undetected if it interferes with the
OOB channel (although it can still eavesdrop).
Our Contributions. Based on the protocol of Saxena et al.
[14], we develop a novel initialization method using a visual
OOB channel. The underlying visual channel consists of blink-
ing LEDs3 as transmitters on sensor nodes and a video camera
on the administrator’s computer. The design of such a channel
using multiple LEDs solves an open problem posed in [14] and
finds a useful application in the context of key distribution for
a sensor network.
Based on our current experiments, we show that with a cheap
web cam connected to a laptop computer, we are efficiently able
to use the above visual channel to securely initialize 16 sensor
nodes per batch. In addition, we perform a usability testing
2Although it is not clear how many motes at one time.
3Most commercially available sensor motes possess multiple (typically three)
LEDs. (Refer to Mica2 specifications: http://www.xbow.com/Products/Product
pdf files/Wireless pdf/MICA2 Datasheet.pdf)
of the proposed method, which shows that the method is both
user-friendly as well as robust to errors.
As opposed to MiB [11], our proposal is based upon public-
key cryptography. We note, however, that most commercial
sensor motes are efficiently able to perform public key cryp-
tography [15].
II. RELATED WORK
The problem of secure sensor node initialization has been
considered only recently. Prior to MiB method of [11] (which
we reviewed in the previous section), the following schemes
were proposed. The “Shake-them-up” [16] scheme suggests a
simple manual technique for pairing two sensor nodes that
involves shaking and twirling them in very close proximity
to each other, in order to prevent eavesdropping. While being
shaken, two sensor nodes exchange packets and agree on a
key one bit at a time, relying on the adversary’s inability to
determine the sending node. However, it turns out that the
sender can be identified using radio fingerprinting [17] and the
security of this scheme is uncertain.
Another two related schemes are: “Smart-Its Friends” [18]
and “Are You with Me?” [19]. Both use human-controlled
movement to establish a secret key between two devices. In
addition to having the same problems as “Shake-Them-Up”,
these schemes require an accelerometer on each sensor node to
measure movement. Most sensor nodes can not afford to have
accelerometers.
The initialization method that we propose in this paper is
similar to the device pairing schemes that use an OOB channel.
Thus, we also review most relevant device pairing methods and
argue whether or not they can be extended for the application
of sensor node initialization. In their seminal work, Stajano and
Anderson [20] proposed to establish a shared secret between
two devices using a link created through a physical contact
(such as an electric cable). As pointed out previously, this
approach requires interfaces not available on most sensor motes.
Moreover, the approach would be unscalable.
Balfanz, et al. [10] extended the above approach through the
use of infrared as an OOB channel – the devices exchange their
public keys over the wireless channel followed by exchanging
(at least 80-bits long) hashes of their respective public keys
over infrared. Most sensor motes do not possess infrared
transmitters. Also, infrared is not easily perceptible by humans.
Based on the protocol of Balfanz et al. [10], McCune et
al. proposed the “Seeing-is-Believing” (SiB) scheme [12]. SiB
involves establishing two unidirectional visual OOB channels
– one device encodes the data into a two-dimensional barcode
and the other device reads it using a photo camera. To apply
SiB for sensor node initialization, one would need to affix a
static barcode (during the manufacturing phase) on each sensor
node, which can be captured by a camera on the sink node.
However, this will only provide unidirectional authentication,
since the sensor nodes can not afford to have a camera each.
Note that it will also not be possible to manually input on each
sensor node the hash of the public key of the sink, since most
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sensor nodes do not possess keypads and even if they do, this
will not scale.
Saxena et al. [14] proposed a new scheme based on visual
OOB channel. The scheme uses one of the protocols based on
Short Authenticated Strings (SAS) [21], [22], and is aimed at
pairing two devices (such as a cell phone and an access point),
only one of which has a relevant receiver (such as a camera).
The protocol is depicted in Figure 1 and as we will see in the
next section, this is the protocol that we utilize in our proposal.
In this paper, we extend the above scheme to a “many-to-
one” setting applicable to key distribution in sensor networks.
Basically, the novel OOB channel that we build consists of
multiple devices blinking their SAS data simultaneously, which
is captured using a camera connected to the sink.
Recently, Soriente et al. [23] consider the problem of pairing
two devices based on an audio channel. Their scheme can be
based on the protocol of [14], with the unidirectional SAS
channel consisting of one device encoding its SAS data into
audio, and the other device capturing it using a microphone.
Extending this scheme to initialize multiple sensor nodes in
a scalable manner seems hard as it will be hard to decode
simultaneously “beeping” nodes.
There are a variety of other pairing schemes, based on
manual comparison/transfer of OOB data: [13], [24] can not
be used on sensor nodes as they require displays; [25], [26]
are applicable on sensor nodes but would not scale well due to
their manual nature.
III. COMMUNICATION AND SECURITY MODEL, AND THE
UNDERLYING PROTOCOL
Model. The protocol that we utilize in our initialization method
is based upon the following communication and adversarial
model [27]. The devices being paired are connected via two
types of channels: (1) a short-range, high-bandwidth bidi-
rectional wireless channel, and (2) auxiliary low-bandwidth
physical OOB channel(s). Based on device types, the OOB
channel(s) can be device-to-device (d2d), device-to-human
(d2h) and/or human-to-device (h2d). An adversary attacking
the pairing protocol is assumed to have full control on the
wireless channel, namely, it can eavesdrop, delay, drop, replay
and modify messages. On the OOB channel, the adversary can
eavesdrop on but can not modify messages. In other words,
the OOB channel is assumed to be an authenticated channel.
The security notion for a pairing protocol in this setting is
adopted from the model of authenticated key agreement due to
Canneti and Krawczyk [28]. In this model, a multi-party setting
is considered wherein a number of parties simultaneously run
multiple/parallel instances of pairing protocols. In practice,
however, it is reasonable to assume only two-parties running
only a few serial/parallel instances of the pairing protocol. For
example, during authentication for an ATM transaction, there
are only two parties, namely the ATM machine and a user,
restricted to only three authentication attempts. The security
model does not consider denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Note
that on wireless channels, explicit attempts to prevent DoS
attacks might not be useful because an adversary can simply
launch an attack by jamming the wireless signal.
In a communication setting involving two users restricted
to running three instances of the protocol, the SAS protocol
of [14] need to transmit only k (= 15) bits of data over the
OOB channels. As long as the cryptographic primitives used in
the protocols are secure, an adversary attacking these protocols
can not win with a probability significantly higher than 2−k (=
2−15). This gives us security equivalent to the security provided
by 5-digit PIN-based ATM authentication.
Protocol. The protocol that we utilize [14] is depicted in Figure
1 (we base the protocol upon the SAS protocol of [21], although
it can similarly work with other SAS protocol [22] as well). The
protocol works as follows. Over the wireless channel, devices A
(sensor node) and B (sink) follow the underlying SAS protocol.
Then a unidirectional OOB channel is established by device
A transmitting the SAS data, over the d2d channel. This is
followed by device B comparing the received data with its own
copy of the SAS data, and transmitting the resulting bit b of
comparison over the 1-bit d2h OOB channel (say, displayed
on its screen). Finally, the user reads the transmitted bit b and
accordingly indicates the result to device A by transmitting the
same bit b over an h2d input channel.
For our application of secure initialization of sensor nodes,
we execute the protocol of [14] in a “many-to-one” setting.
Basically, the sink runs serial or (preferably) parallel instances
of the pairing protocol over the wireless channel with each
of the n sensor nodes belonging to a batch. The SAS data,
however, is transmitted simultaneously from each sensor node
to the sink. Since the SAS data is transmitted simultaneously
by each sensor node, the sink has no efficient way to figure
out what SAS value was transmitted by which of the sensor
nodes it discovered over the wireless channel. Therefore, the
sink accepts the key distribution on a particular sensor node
A if the SAS value (derived from information transmitted over
the wireless channel) corresponding to A matches with any
of the n SAS values received over the SAS channel. Sensor
node A is therefore accepted with a probability at most n2−k
instead of 2−k as in the original “one-to-one” setting. One can
show that such a “many-to-one” variant can be proven secure.
In other words, one can show that if there exists an adversary
who breaks, with a probability significantly better than n2−k,
the above many-to-one variant of the protocol of [14], then there
exists another adversary who can break the protocol of [14] with
a probability significantly better than 2−k. We omit this proof in
this paper and concentrate on the design and implementation
of the underlying SAS channel, using multiple LEDs and a
video camera. Note that in order to achieve the same level
of security offered by a 5-digit PIN-based authentication (as
mentioned above), the length of the SAS data should now be
15 + log2(n).
The security of our initialization method is equivalent to the
security of the underlying SAS protocol, under the assumption
that the administrator correctly discards the sensor nodes based
on the result (bit b corresponding to each sensor node) indicated
3
A (sensor node) B (sink)
Pick RA ∈ {0, 1}k
(cA, dA)← commit(pkA, RA)
pkA,cA // Pick RB ∈ {0, 1}k
pkB ,RBoo
dA //
SASA = RB ⊕HRA (pkB)
SASA +3
RA ← open(pkA, cA, dA)
bks _ _ _ __ _ _ _ boo_ _ _ _ b← (SASA == RB ⊕HRA (pkB))
Accept pkB as B’s public key if Accept pkA as A’s public key if
b = 1 b = 1
//oo : the wireless channel
+3 : the unidirectional d2d channel
oo_ _ _ _ : the d2h channel
ks _ _ __ _ _ : the h2d channel
pkA, pkB : public keys of devices A and B
commit() and open(): functions of a commitment scheme based on random oracle model (in practice, SHA-1/MD5)
H(): hash function drawn from an almost universal hash function family
Fig. 1: The protocol by Saxena et al. [14] based on the SAS protocol of [21]
by sink.
IV. OUR PROPOSAL: SECURE INITIALIZATION USING A
VISUAL CHANNEL
In this section, we describe the design and implementation
of an efficient, scalable, user friendly and commercially viable
method of secure initialization for sensor nodes. The core
of our solution relies on the protocol of [14] executed in a
many-to-one setting, as mentioned in the previous section. For
transmitting the SAS data of all sensor nodes simultaneously
over the visual channel, the LEDs of sensor nodes are used
for ON-OFF encoding, and for receiving the data, video frame
based image processing is used on the receiver side.
A. Set-up of the Mechanism
In our setup (Figure 3), the administrator’s computer (the
sink) is connected (using a USB interface) with a sensor node
having the functionality of a base station. The sink is also
connected with a video camera (a web cam). The sensor nodes
and the sink communicate over the wireless channel. Sensor
nodes have their on board displays implemented using two
types of LEDs – one Sync LED (used for synchronizing the
data transmission between the sensor node and the sink) and
at least one Data LED (used for transmitting SAS data). The
Data LEDs can be of any color (same or different), but their
color(s) should be different from the color of the Sync LED.
The blinking LEDs on sensor nodes are used to transmit the
SAS data, which is captured using the camera on the sink. The
sink matches the received SAS data with its own copy of the
acquired SAS data for each sensor node and based on this,
learns whether a particular sensor node “passed” or “failed”
during the process. The sink also displays on its screen the
result corresponding to each sensor node. Based on the result
indicated, the administrator must remove or turn off the failed
sensor nodes. In case the sink is also connected with a printer,
the screen indicating the result can also be printed, to better
assist the administrator.
B. Role of the Administrator
The administrator needs to follow the steps shown in Figure
2. On completion of Step 5, the sink makes use of the
resulting secure channels between itself and each sensor node
to bootstrap any of the key pre-distribution schemes, e.g., [4].
Step 1. The administrator turns on the sensor nodes and places them on a
table, one by one.
Step 2. The administrator presses the “Start” button on the sink. This triggers
the sink to sense the nearby sensor nodes and signal them over the wireless
channel to start an instance each of the protocol of Figure 1. Once done
with their SAS data computation, the sensor nodes show a “Ready” signal
to the administrator by lighting up their red LEDs, and the sink shows the
message “Focus the Camera on Ready Sensor nodes and Press OK”.
Step 3. The administrator adjusts the camera accordingly to capture the
LEDs of the ready sensor nodes and presses the “OK” button on the sink.
The sink sends a “Start Transmission” signal over wireless channel to all
sensor nodes simultaneously to transmit their SAS data. All the sensor nodes
transmit their SAS data simultaneously and the camera on the sink captures
and decodes the data, and shows the result on the screen and/or prints it
out.
Step 4. The administrator turns off the failed sensor nodes based on the
on-screen or printed output. The turning off of a sensor node is to be
implemented in such a manner that it is equivalent to the sensor node
rejecting the protocol instance it executed with the sink. If the administrator
does not turn off a particular sensor node, within an (experimentally
determined) time period ∆, by default, the protocol instance will be accepted
by the sensor node. (The default acceptance mechanism is adopted in order
to improve the usability of our method. Under normal circumstances, i.e.,
when no attacks or errors occur, the administrator does not need to turn off
any sensor node.)
Step 5. Steps 1-4 are repeated, batch by batch, until all sensor nodes
successfully initialized.
Fig. 2: The Administrator’s Role
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C. Design and Implementation
Our sensor node initialization method requires three phases:
(1) the device discovery phase, whereby the sink discovers each
sensor node (over the wireless channel)4, (2) protocol execution
phase, whereby the first three rounds of the SAS protocol of
Figure 1 are executed between the sink and each sensor node,
and (3) the SAS data transmission, whereby the sensor nodes
simultaneously transmit their SAS data, the sink captures them,
matches each of them with the local copies and accordingly
indicates to the administrator to discard any failed sensor nodes.
We were most interested in the third phase as it is an essential
element of our proposal. To this end, we have developed an
application in Microsoft Visual C# that simulates our sensor
node initialization process. The application has two parts –
the transmitter simulating the sensor nodes and the receiver
simulating the sink; running on two different computers. The
transmitter encodes and transmits the SAS data using the
display consisting of three blinking LEDs per sensor node.
All sensor nodes show the ith bit of their respective SAS
data simultaneously. The sink captures the transmitted data as
a video stream using its camera, extracts the SAS data for
each sensor node, compares it with its own local copy for the
corresponding sensor node and displays the result on screen
and/or prints it out through a printer connected to it. Instead
of dealing with real sensor motes5, we simulated the display
of sensor motes using LEDs on a breadboard, integrated with
the transmitter through the parallel port of the transmitting
computer.
1) Encoding using LEDs: In our simulation, each sensor
node is equipped with one Sync LED(red color LED) for syn-
chronization at the beginning and end of SAS data transmission
and two Data LEDs(green color LEDs) for transmitting the
SAS data. We simulated the display of a total of 16 sensor
nodes on a breadboard(Figure 6) each having three LEDs
as most commercially available sensor motes; however, our
implementation supports an arbitrary number of LEDs (with
an arbitrary physical topology) and two distinct but not fixed
color LEDs(for differentiating Sync and Data LEDs).
The sync LED (kept “ON” at the beginning and end of SAS
data transmission; “OFF”, otherwise) is used to indicate the
beginning and end of the SAS data transmission and to detect
any synchronization delays, adversarial or otherwise, between
the sensor nodes and the sink.
The data LEDs are used for SAS data transmission by in-
dicating different bits (‘0’/‘1’) using different states (OFF/ON)
4The sink as well as the sensor nodes need to know the actual number n
of sensor nodes being initialized in one batch, since the length k of random
nonces RA and RB and of SASA in the protocol of Figure 1, should ideally
be equal to 15 + log2(n) (as discussed in Section III). However, an adversary
might influence the value of n the sink and the sensor nodes determine by
sensing over the wireless channel. Therefore, one can hard-code the value of k
on the sensor nodes and on the sink, based on the expected maximum number
of sensor nodes to be initialized in a batch. For example, one can safely set k
to be 20, if it is expected that at most only 32 sensor nodes will be initialized
in a batch.
5Clearly, since we wanted to deal with a number of sensor motes, a testbed
consisting of real sensor motes was not affordable, nor was it necessary.
of LEDs. If N is the number of Data LEDs, the transmitter can
display N bits of SAS data at a time. The states of the sync
and data LEDs are kept unchanged for a certain time period
(named “hold time”; experimentally determined as 250ms); so
that, a stable state (named “BitFrame”) can be easily captured
in the video stream of the receiver video camera. After every
250 ms, next N bits of the SAS data are simultaneously shown
by each sensor node in the next frame. This process continues
until all bits of SAS data are transmitted. If the last frame does
not have N number of SAS bits to show, the beginning required
LEDs show the data bits and the remaining are kept OFF.
For discovering the location, color, dimension of LEDs for
each sensor node at the receiver side, two extra frames are
needed at the beginning of data transmission – an “All-ON”
frame having all LEDs in ON state and an “All-OFF” frame
having all LEDs in OFF state. In addition to All-ON and All-
OFF frames, another frame is required at the end of SAS data
transmission, to detect synchronization delays having the Sync
LED in ON state and the data LEDs in OFF state. Therefore,
overall a total of three extra frames are required. Thus, for 20-
bit SAS data transmission(recall that [15 + log2(16)]-bit long
SAS is required for 16 sensor nodes) the total number of frames
to be transmitted is d 20N e+ 3, which yields a total transmission
time of (d 20N e+ 3)× 250 ms. For transmitting 20-bit SAS data
using N=2 data LEDs, there is requirement of a total of 13
frames and thus a total of 3.25 seconds of transmission and
capturing time.
2) Decoding using a Video Camera: For successfully decod-
ing the data transmitted using the LEDs of sensor nodes, the
receiver video camera must have a frame rate higher than the
transmission rate. If frames are not carefully captured from the
video stream, there is a likelihood of obtaining the counterfeit
frames, which contain the transition state of LEDs.
Resolving the Timing Issue of Frame Capturing. We assume
that the transmission delay of “Start Transmission” (ST) signal
from the receiver to the transmitter is negligible (5-6 ms)
compared to the “hold time” (HT) (of 250 ms) and the receiver
video camera also has a delay (about 30-40 ms, since most
common cameras have a rate of 30-40 frames per second)
of capturing the frame from video stream. Bases on this
assumption, the receiver captures the first frame from the video
stream after a time, equal to 0.6× HT (i.e. after 150 ms), termed
as “initial waiting” (IW), after sending the signal. The sink pre-
calculates capturing (saving frames into memory from video
stream buffer) timestamps for all frames by adding the IW +
(HT (250ms) ×“frame index”), with the timestamp of sending
of the ST signal. The frames are captured into memory at the
corresponding timestamps. Figure 4 depicts the synchronization
of transmission and reception of SAS data. In this figure each
small rectangle on the receiving window denotes a video frame
of video stream and brown arrow marked with “Video Frame
Streaming” denotes the propagation of transmitted signal to
streamed frame in the video stream, which implies that there is
some propagation delay of an input transition from transmitter’s
side to the receiver’s video stream.
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Fig. 3: The Overall Set-up of Mechanism Fig. 4: Synchronization of Transmission (using LEDs) and Reception (on sink)
of Data
Detection of LEDs and Retrieval of SAS data. The frames
are processed after the completion of capturing of all required
frames. Our LED location and dimension detection algorithm is
simple yet fast, robust and efficient, unlike existing object/face
detection algorithms [29], [30], [31]. The algorithm detects the
position and dimension of LEDs deterministically. It is able to
detect any shape/geometry of LEDs unlike [31] and does not
require any prior training unlike [29], [30]. The algorithm uses
the color threshold adjustment technique like [32] to detect the
position and dimension of LEDs.
The maximal differences of RGB values, max(dR, dG, dB)
(denoted as µ), of each pixel of All-OFF and All-ON frames
are measured and kept in memory. Using a threshold value for
µ, bit-strings are built for each row of pixels. For example, if µ
exceeds a certain threshold, the corresponding bit in the string
becomes ‘1’, otherwise it becomes a ‘0’.
Each bit-string is matched against a regular expression for
consecutive 1s. For each matching bit-string, its center is
calculated and its safeness and centeredness as an LED center
is checked by matching against the already explored LEDs and
exploring only the nearby pixels of this center in the frame. If
its safeness and centeredness is proved, it is accepted as an LED
and its coordinates are included in the explored list of LEDs.
This process continues up to a number of times by adjusting
the threshold value of µ and constructing the new bit strings
until all LEDs are detected. In Figure 7, we show an example
of detection of LEDs from the bit-string.
After successful discovery of LEDs, the length, width, aver-
age RGB values of ON and OFF states of LED area, for each
LED are stored in memory for detecting the ON/OFF state of
LEDs in subsequent BitFrames. Successfully discovered LEDs
are clustered according to a threshold value of proximity among
themselves, for identifying the displays of different sensor
nodes.
After successful detection of all sensor nodes, the data LEDs
of each sensor node are sorted according to the left-to-right and
top-to-bottom ordering of coordinates. Now SAS data for each
sensor node is extracted from the BitFrames by comparing the
average RGB values of LEDs with previously saved (from All-
OFF and All-ON frames) OFF and ON state RGB values of
LEDs. For each extracted SAS, the sink matches it with its
own computed list of “free” SAS values. If there is a match,
the sink marks the corresponding computed SAS as “used”
and the sensor node as “SAS Matched”. If extracted SAS of a
sensor node does not match with any free SAS values, the
corresponding sensor node and all sensor nodes having the
same SAS are marked as “SAS Mismatched”. Each BitFrame
is then examined: the Sync LEDs of all sensor nodes should
be in the OFF state, except for the last frame, where the Sync
LED should be in the ON state and all data LEDs of all sensor
nodes should be in the OFF state. If this is not the case, it
implies that a synchronization error occurred.
If for a sensor node, both “SAS Matched” and “Sync
Matched” are true, the sink accepts the sensor node as a
“passed”; otherwise, it rejects the sensor node as a “failed” due
to mismatch of SAS and/or synchronization errors. The LEDs
of a passed sensor node are marked with a rectangle of green
color; and the LEDs of a failed sensor node are crossed out
with red color (Figure 8). Additionally, an automatic printing
of the result-screen is done by the printer connected to the sink.
By observing the graphical result on screen of the sink and/or
the printed result, the administrator discards the failed sensor
nodes.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
A. Experimental Setup
To test our simulator implementing the sensor node ini-
tialization method, we used the following set-up. The sink is
running on a DELL Vostro 1500 Laptop (1.6 GHz CPU, 2GB
RAM, WinXP Pro SP2) connected with a USB Web Camera
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Fig. 5: Setup: Receiver is Web camera,
Transmitters are LEDs on Breadboard
Fig. 6: Transmitter: Breadboard with
48 LEDs Simulating 16 Sensor Nodes
Fig. 7: Detected LEDs from BitString
(Microsoft LifeCam VX6000, up to 30 frames/sec, live video
streaming of resolution 640X480 pixels) and a wireless printer.
The webcam can be replaced with any similar camera with a
frame rate 30 fps or higher, without any modification to the
existing simulator. The camera is set in NON STOP video
capturing mode and frames are taken setting the camera in
preview mode. Camera controller is added to the simulator to
allow adjusting the focus, tilt and pan of camera as needed.
The transmitting side of the simulator runs on a DELL
desktop computer (1.8 GHz CPU, 1 GB RAM, WinXP Pro SP2)
connected with LEDs on breadboard (Figure 6) through parallel
port (DB25 Connector). The laptop and the desktop computer
are connected with our university’s wireless connection (54
Mbps). Figure 5 has a snapshot of our set-up.
B. Usability Testing
In order to test how our method fares with non-expert users,
and especially to figure out if the users are easily and correctly
able to discard the failed sensor nodes based on the result screen
(and/or print-out), we performed a usability study.
Testing Framework. For creating an automated testing frame-
work, we extended the transmitter application running on
the desktop computer by implementing the usability testing
and user feedback collection functionality on it. The sink
application running on the laptop was configured to send
the result (indicating passed or failed sensor nodes) to the
desktop application, as soon as it was determined. As there
is no interface on breadboard using which the users can turn
off the failed sensor node(s), we simulated the “turning off”
mechanism in the desktop application. As soon as the desktop
application receives the result from the laptop application, it
shows the layout of the sensor node field (i.e., the breadboard)
on screen, associating each sensor node with a transparent
button with the layout of the sensor node in the background.
The users are instructed to transfer the result from the laptop
screen to the desktop screen by clicking on the buttons (on
the desktop screen) corresponding to the failed sensor nodes
shown on the laptop screen. After test completion, the desktop
application has the functionality of showing the questionnaires
to obtain user feedback and logging the data. In our current
tests, we did not make use of the printed output.
Test Cases. We created five categories of test cases to evaluate
our method against different types of possible attacks and er-
rors. These included (1) matching SAS and no synchronization
errors (to simulate normal execution scenarios, where no attacks
or faults occur), (2) (single- and multiple-bit) SAS mismatch
on a varying number of sensor nodes; (3) missing, pre-mature
and delayed turning on of the Sync LED (to simulate synchro-
nization errors), (4) both SAS mismatch and synchronization
errors, and (5) variable distance (from 0.5 to 2 feet) between the
camera and the transmitters. Ten test cases for each category
were created. Each user executed a total of five test cases, one
each selected randomly from each of the five categories.
A (portion of the) screenshot of the result of execution of
one of the test cases is shown in Figure 8.
Fig. 8: Result Screen: 7 Failed Sensor Nodes (marked by “red
cross”), 9 Passed Sensor Nodes (marked by “green rectangle”)
Test Participants. We recruited 21 subjects for our usability
testing. Subjects were chosen on a first-come first-serve basis
from respondents to recruiting posters and email ads. At the end
of the tests, the participants were asked to fill out an on screen
questionnaire through which we obtained user demographics
and their feedback on the method tested.
Recruited subjects were mostly university students, both
graduate and undergraduate, with CS and non-CS back-
grounds. This resulted in a fairly young (ages between 22-
31 [mean=25.48, se=0.5417]), well-educated participant group.
All participants were regular computer users. 19 out of 21
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participants reported they have previously used a PC camera
(for internet chat). None of the study participants reported
any physical impairments that could have interfered with their
ability to complete given task. The gender split was: 17 males
and 4 females.
Testing Process. Our study was conducted in a graduate student
laboratory of our university. Each participant was given a
brief overview of our study goals and our experimental set-
up. Each participating user was then asked to follow on-screen
instructions on the laptop and desktop computer. No training of
any sort was given. Basically, the participants played the role
of the administrator in the sensor node initialization method, as
depicted in Figure 2. Sink output, user interactions throughout
the tests and timings were logged automatically by the testing
framework.
After completing the deputed test cases in the above manner,
the participants were asked to give some qualitative feedback on
how easy or hard they found to focus the camera on all LEDs,
to read the result of the output screen and about the overall
ease/difficulty of the method. Participants demographic infor-
mation such as age, gender, educational qualification, visual
disability, computer and camera experience is also collected
through this questionnaire. All user data and feedback was
logged by the testing framework for future analysis.
Test Results. Each of our 21 subjects executed 5 test cases,
leading to a total of 105 test cases. Most of the test cases
executed successfully giving expected results. In some cases,
however, we observed a few errors, which we categorize and
describe below.
1. Camera Adjustment Error: We configured our usability
testing application in such manner that if all the LEDs are not
within the camera viewpoint, an error message is shown to the
user asking him/her to re-execute. In our tests, 2 users failed to
adjust the camera on one occasion each and thus they had to
repeat the tests. Therefore, the rate of camera adjustment error
equals 2(105+2) × 100% = 1.87% of test cases.
2. Sink Mis-reading Error: Sometimes the sink is not able to
correctly read the SAS string(s) transmitted by one or more
sensor nodes. This could happen when the camera is too distant
(> 2 feet) from the sensor nodes or due to reflection of LED
light on the table and other nearby surfaces. In our tests, this
type of error occurred for a total of 7 sensor nodes, where
SAS strings of 1 or 2 sensor nodes were mis-read in some
5 test cases. In 105 tes tcases, the sink dealt with a total of
(105 × 16) = 1680 sensor nodes on breadboard and out of
them 7 sensor nodes failed due to sink errors. So, rate of sink
mis-reading error equals 71680 × 100% = 0.417%. Note that all
of these errors were only false positives, i.e., the mistakenly
marked a passed sensor node as a failed one.
3. User Error: A user error occurs when the user is not
able to correctly transfer the result, from the laptop screen
to the desktop screen (simulating switching off of the failed
sensor node). In our tests, 3 users accidentally clicked, on one
occasion each, a passed sensor node on the desktop screen (this
implies that a passed sensor node was turned off). However,
it is important to note that on no occasions did a user miss
clicking on a failed sensor node. In other words, we did get
a few false positives but no false negatives whatsoever. Thus,
rate of user errors from our tests turned out to be equal to
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1680 × 100% = 0.18%.
The average time taken by each user (over the 5 test cases),
to complete Steps 2 to 4 of Figure 2, is depicted in Figure 9.
As we see, the time taken by all of our users to perform a
test is less than a minute [mean=26.5 seconds, se=1.37]. Note
that these numbers arise when we assume a fairly conservative
setting, one where both normal scenarios and attacks or faults
occur with equal likelihood. However, in practice, attacks or
faults are less likely. Therefore, considering only the normal
test case, we find that that on an average a user only takes
19.18 seconds [se=1.11] to complete the whole process.
Fig. 9: Average time (per test case execution) taken by 21
subjects with standard error. Subjects sorted by average time.
The results we obtained through the user feedback question-
naire are shown in Table I. Clearly, most users found the method
robust and quite easy to work with.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We proposed a novel method for secure initialization of
sensor nodes. Based on our testing with the method, we make
the following conclusions.
Efficiency: Using N Data LEDs and one Sync LED per sensor
node, the transmission requires [d 20N e + 3] × 250 ms. This is
equal to 3.25 sec for N=2 and 20-bit SAS data. Extraction
of SAS data from captured frames and displaying the result
on screen require less than 3-4 seconds. So, execution time of
the method is 7-8 seconds. Overall, as our experiment results
show, most users took less than a minute to perform the whole
process. Also, as shown in [15], most existing commercial
sensor motes (e.g. Mica2) can efficiently execute (within a
minute) the public key operations (private and public key
generation, and one exponentiation). Note that these operations
constitute the dominant costs in the SAS protocol (of Figure
1) that a sensor node executes with the sink. The sink, on the
other hand, is assumed to be a computer with a fairly strong
computational power and therefore can efficiently execute n
parallel protocol instances with each of the sensor nodes.6
6The protocol of Figure 1 works with sink’s permanent public/private keys.
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Easiness Very Easy Easy Medium Difficult Difficult Very Difficult Impossible
Camera Adjustment to LEDs 5 13 3 0 0 0
Detection of Failed Sensor Nodes 11 10 0 0 0 0
Easiness of Mechanism 7 10 4 0 0 0
TABLE I: User Feedback (numbers denote the number of users)
Based on the above numbers, we recommend setting ∆ = 2
minutes, as the time period (to complete Steps 2 to 4 of Figure
2) by which the key initialization will be accepted by each
sensor node, by default. As our experiments show, within 2
minutes, a human user can safely complete the initialization
process, turning off any (failed) sensor nodes, if necessary.
Power Requirements: From [15], we know that most available
commercial sensor motes can do public key crypto operations
using only a small amount of power. Now, we show that the
SAS data transmission through blinking LEDs also incurs a
minimal overhead on sensor motes in terms of power. For 20-
bit SAS data transmission, the three LEDs on each sensor mote
light-up 13 times (for a period of 250ms), i.e., for a duration
of 13 × 250=3.25seconds. Each LED has a drop voltage, V =
2.9 Volts (typical range 1.7-3.3 Volts); Current Rating, I= 2.2
mA (typical range 2-3 mA). Therefore, the maximum energy
consumption per sensor mote (3 LEDs), E=3 × (V × I × t)=
3×(2.9×2.2×10−3×3.25) Volt-A-seconds =0.062205 Joules.
As stated in [15], the Energizer No. E91, two AA batteries
used in Mica2 motes, have a total energy of 2× (1.5×2.850×
3600)=30780 Joules. So, our SAS data transmission requires
0.062205
30780 ×100% = 0.0002% of battery life of Mica2. As shown
in [15], public key generation requires 0.816 Joules of energy.
Thus, our SAS data transmission is more that 13.11 times better
than the public key generation in terms of power consumption
Robustness: Our method is quite robust to varying distances
between the transmitter and receiver. The distance between the
camera and sensor motes on breadboard can be up to 2 feet. The
method also works quite well in varying lighting and brightness
conditions as it deterministically learns the environment using
the first two, All-OFF and All-ON, frames in each session.
The method could fail in presence of background noise during
transmission and reception of SAS data. It will not work in
blackout or blackout in the middle of transmission. Huge vari-
ations of lighting conditions during transmission of SAS data
which exceed color threshold of LEDs or shaking/displacement
of all sensor motes/camera while transmission of SAS data
exceeding the dimension threshold of LEDs will also cause
failure of the method. However, these will only lead to false
positives and not to an attack. Except for the camera adjustment
errors (as discussed in Section V-B), all errors occurring with
our method are localized i.e, if a single sensor mote fails due
to some reason, only that particular sensor node needs to be
re-initialized. Note that this is unlike the MiB scheme of [11],
where any errors lead to the re-initialization/re-keying of the
whole batch of sensor motes. Even when camera adjustment
occur in our method, only the SAS data transmission needs
be repeated, not the whole initialization process. On the other
hand, MiB is less prone to user errors than our method.
However, our results indicate that our user errors only lead
to false positives and are negligible nevertheless. In our future
work, we plan to explore how default rejection (as opposed to
our current default acceptance mechanism) would impact the
efficiency, usability and scalability of our method. It will clearly
improve security.
Scalability: Our method can be used to to initialize multiple
sensor nodes per batch. We tested the method with 16 sensor
nodes having three LEDs each. By using good quality wide-
angle cameras (which will somewhat increase the overall cost of
the system), this number can be greatly improved, we believe.
We are currently exploring ways to make our method more
scalable. Note that increase in the number of sensor nodes will
come at only a slight cost of increase in the length of SAS data.
For example, to support 128 sensor nodes, we would need to
transmit 22 SAS bits.
Usability: Via a systematic usability study, we find that our
method is quite user friendly. It does not require any expertise
or prior training. Little or no acquaintance with the method is
enough to administer the process. It is easy to work with and
enables easy detection of failed sensor nodes by observing the
result on the screen of the sink. Unlike the MiB scheme of [11],
the administrator does not have to deal with a specialized and
often cumbersome Faraday Cage. Of course, the administrator
has to deal with a camera in our method, however, most
users are getting more and more familiar with cameras as
they become ubiquitous. Moreover, a camera can be used
for purposes other than key distribution and is thus not truly
specialized. Also note that the sensor motes per batch do not
need to be homogeneous. They can have different number, color
of LEDs, in any topology whatsoever (the only requirement
being they all possess one RED colored LED to act as the
Sync LED). Recall that this is unlike MiB [11], which can only
support homogeneous sensor motes with very similar weights.
We consider this as an important issue with respect to usability
– an administrator might need to initialize a diverse pool of
sensor motes and should not need to group them up.
Simplicity and Economic Viability: The sink needs only a
camera and each sensor nodes require at least two LEDs (one
Sync and one Data) which are very cheap and commonly
available. In fact, most existing commercial sensor motes have
three LEDs. Our method is quite economic, as opposed to
MiB [11] which requires a specialized Faraday Cage and an
additional sensor mote (called “keying devices”) having USB
interfaces.
Resistance to Malicious Sensor Nodes: Our method offers a
natural protection against corrupted or malicious sensor nodes7.
7A manufacturer could possibly sneak in malicious sensor node(s) along
with normal sensor nodes shipped to a customer, as pointed out in [11].
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Our method is based on an authenticated key exchange protocol
following the security model of [28]. This model guarantees
that an adversary who learns session key(s) corresponding to
some corrupted session(s), does not learn any information about
the keys corresponding to other uncorrupted sessions. This is
unlike MiB [11], where a single corrupted sensor node can
compromise keys corresponding to all other sensor nodes8.
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